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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
PETE FLOOR, : Case No. 20040779-CA 
Defendant/Appellant, : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2004), and possession of a firearm by a user of controlled substances, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-10-503(l)(b)(iv) and (3)(a) (2003). This 
Court has jurisdiction over criminal convictions other than first degree felonies. Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. The reasonableness requirement under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution requires the police to knock and announce their purpose and presence 
and then to wait a reasonable time before entering when executing search warrants. In 
this case, two plain clothes police officers engaged Mr. Floor's wife in conversation at 
the threshold of Mr. Floor's residence without disclosing their identities or purpose. 
Upon announcing that they were police officers serving a search warrant, the officers 
immediately entered the residence when they saw Mr. Floor's wife move a half or full 
step backwards. Did the police officers' failure to wait a reasonable time before entering 
constitute an illegal search? 
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this Court reviews the trial court's 
factual determinations for clear err and its legal conclusions for correctness. State v. 
Ribe, 876 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Mr. Floor preserved his arguments for 
appellate review by raising them in his motion to suppress and at the suppression 
hearing. R. 42-53; 129.* 
2. This Court has ruled that a violation of the knock-and-announce rule does not 
necessarily require the suppression of evidence. But, this Court made that ruling before 
the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment constitutionally 
requires the police to knock, announce their presence and purpose, and then wait a 
reasonable time for a response. Because the police officers' failure to wait violated 
fundamental constitutional rights, was the trial judge required to suppress the fruits of the 
illegal entry? 
'The transcript numbered 129 contains the record of the suppression hearing. The 
internal page numbers of that volume are included after "R. 129.M 
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Determining whether the state or federal constitutions require the suppression of 
evidence presents a question of law which this Court reviews for correctness. State v. 
Deherrera. 965 P.2d 501, 503 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Defense counsel requested the trial 
judge to suppress the evidence. R. 42-53, 129: 31-33. Because the trial judge found no 
constitutional violation, he had no occasion to address the suppression issue. 
RELEVANT STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Addendum contains the following judgment, statute, and constitutional 
provisions: 
Addendum A: Judgment, August 16, 2003 
Addendum B: Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (2003) 
Addendum C: Utah Const, art. I, § 14 
Addendum D: United States Const. Amend. IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 20, 2003, the State filed an Information accusing Mr. Floor of 
possession of a controlled substance, child endangerment, possession of a firearm by a 
person using drugs, and possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 1-3. Mr. Floor waived his 
right to a preliminary hearing and, instead, filed a motion to suppress evidence that the 
police obtained as the fruits of an illegal search. R. 35, 42. The trial judge held a 
hearing on the motion and denied Mr. Floor's request to suppress the evidence. R. 71-
74, 129: 35-37. 
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Mr. Floor then agreed to plead guilty to possession of a controlled substance and 
possession of a firearm by a person using drugs. R. 76, 84. As part of the plea 
agreement, Mr. Floor reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. R. 
76. On August 16, 2004, the trial judge sentenced him to concurrent terms of up to five 
years each but suspended the sentences and placed Mr. Floor on probation for 36 months. 
R. 90-92. 
Three days after sentencing, Mr. Floor filed a motion to stay the imposition of 
sentence and petitioned the trial judge for a certificate of probable cause that he was 
likely to prevail on appeal. R. 96, 98. The State stipulated to Mr. Floor's requests. R. 
109. On August 30, 2004, the trial judge stayed Mr. Floor's sentence and certified that 
this appeal presented a "substantial question of law that may result in reversal." IcL at 
109-10. Mr. Floor filed a timely notice of appeal the next day. R. 113. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In late 2003, Salt Lake City police obtained a warrant to search a residence located 
in the avenues area of the city. R. 129: 4. Mr. Floor occupied the residence with his wife 
Connie. Icl at 5, 8. The police were investigating possible drug activity at the residence. 
Id. at 4-5. In requesting the warrant, the police had no specific concerns about the 
possible presence of weapons. Id. at 20-21. Nor, did the police fear that announcing 
their purpose before serving the warrant would risk the destruction of evidence. IcL_ 
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Accordingly, the police requested and obtained a knock-and-announce warrant which 
required them to alert the occupants before entering the residence that they were police 
officers serving a search warrant. Id. at 8, 21. 
At 6:45 p.m., on November 11, 2003, police detectives Doug Teerlink and Steve 
Cutler, together with eight or nine SWAT team members, served the warrant. Id. at 5, 9. 
Detectives Teerlink and Cutler actually served the warrant while the SWAT team hid by 
the side of the house out of sight. Id. at 10-11. The detectives were dressed in plain 
clothes while the SWAT team wore black police uniforms complete with weapons, 
headgear, and "Police" printed on both the front and back of their uniforms. IcL at 5, 9. 
As the detectives approached the front door, they saw that a glass screen door was 
closed but that the inner door was open. Id_ at 5. At the door, they saw Connie standing 
just inside the residence. L± Connie opened the screen door and assumed that the two 
plain-clothed men had come to ask her about her dog that she had advertised was 
missing. Id Connie then asked the two men about her lost dog. Id_ Without identifying 
themselves, the detectives perceived Connie's assumptions about their presence and 
inquired about the missing dog. Id. 
After engaging in this conversation, Det. Cutler thought he heard someone behind 
him whisper, "Come on, let's go." IcL at 17. The detectives then brandished their guns 
and Det. Cutler displayed his police badge as Det. Teerlink announced that the men were 
police officers serving a search warrant. IcL at 6, 8, 13-14, 17. Det. Cutler attested that 
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"[a]s [Det. Teerlink] made the announcement," Connie "took a half step or a step back." 
Id. at 17. Det. Teerlink conceded that once he saw Connie move backwards, he "went in 
immediately[,] didn't wait any longer," and grabbed hold of Connie's arm. Id. at 15. 
Connie reamined within arms length of the door as shown by Det. Teerlink's statement 
that he grabbed Connie while he "essentially" remained on the porch. IcL at 13. 
Det. Teerlink explained that his "concern was that she would be retreating into the 
residence to destroy evidence." Id at 7. Det. Cutler agreed that as recently as the last 
month and-a-half he had served searched warrants when the occupants had destroyed 
evidence before the police could enter the residence. Id. at 18. He also stated that the 
police were "always concerned about the gun issue, especially with the various narcotics 
that were being sold or used in the residence...." Id. 
When Det. Teerlink grabbed Connie, Mr. Floor appeared two or three steps 
behind Connie, grabbed her by the waist from behind, and tried to pull her inside the 
house. Id at 6-7, 17. Det. Cutler then grabbed Det. Teerlink. IcL at 17-18. When Det. 
Cutler saw the SWAT team coming up the stairs to the front door, he let go of Det. 
Teerlink causing both the detective and Connie to fall to the ground. IcL at 18-19. Det. 
Cutler then held the door for the SWAT team to enter. Id. at 19. 
The SWAT team leader, Officer Michael Burbank, entered the residence, pushed 
Mr. Floor back, identified himself, and ordered him to put his hands up. IcL at 28. Mr. 
Floor immediately complied and submitted to Officer Burbank. Id. at 28-29. The police 
6 
searched the residence and found a woman named Jean O'Shea in a back bedroom. R. 4. 
In the bedroom, the police found .6 grams of cocaine, four guns, ammunition, and 
pictures of the three occupants holding the guns. IcL In a separate bedroom and in the 
front room, the police found drug paraphernalia. IcL The police interviewed all three 
occupants and each of them admitted to using cocaine. Id. 
The State filed an Information accusing Mr. Floor of possession of a controlled 
substance, child endangerment, possession of a firearm by a person using drugs, and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 1. The child endangerment charge was based on 
Mr. Floor's statement that Connie's daughter occasionally slept overnight at the 
residence. R. 4. Mr. Floor waived his right to a preliminary hearing and filed a motion 
to suppress the evidence of drug usage. R. 35,42. He claimed that the police violated 
his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when they entered his home 
without waiting for the occupants to respond to the police officers' announcement of a 
search. R. 46-47. 
At a hearing on the motion, Det. Teerlink testified that when Connie moved 
backwards he did not see her try to throw away evidence or grab any objects. R. 129: 13. 
Det. Cutler agreed that he saw no sign of anyone trying to destroy evidence or grab a 
weapon. Id. at 21. Det. Cutler also admitted that the police had no grounds for 
requesting a no-knock search warrant because they only had "limited" information about 
the drug activity at the residence. Id. at 21. 
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Det. Cutler discounted defense counsel's suggestion that Connie may have 
stepped back to let the police inside the house. Id_ at 21-22. Det. Cutler stated that he 
"didn't see it that way. Not where we'd been having a conversation with her initially 
about the dogs and stuff, anyway, everything seemed to be fine." Id. at 22. Finally, none 
of the police officers who testified witnessed any damage to Mr. Floor's residence. Id_ at 
15,22-23,29. 
The trial judge orally denied the motion to suppress. In his findings, he ruled that 
Connie's step backwards didn't "bother [him] as much as at the time that she backed up, 
the officer grabbed her arm and he readily admits, to hold her; but then Mr. Floor got up, 
the defendant, and grabbed her and tried to pull her back in." Id_ at 34. He concluded 
that when "Connie, the female, started to retreat [and] the defendant grabbed her" officer 
safety became an issue. Id at 35. In reaching this conclusion, the trial judge reasoned 
that the police do not "have to wait at that point, let this person retreat out of sight or 
wherever they're going to retreat to and then come back and open the door. I think that 
officers' safety becomes a paramount issue. . . . " Id. at 35-36. The trial judge added that 
"if the Court of Appeals wants to become this specific as to a knock and announce 
warrant. . . then they are going to have to make that decision." Id. at 36. 
In his written order denying the motion, the trial judge ruled that "[e]xigent 
circumstances allowing entry into the residence arose when [Connie] and Defendant 
retreated into the residence." R. 73. He specifically found that when Det. Teerlink 
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announced that the police were serving a search warrant, Connie "responded by 
attempting to retreat into the residence." R. 72. Further, the judge repeated his 
conclusion that "Detective Teerlink's initial entry into the home was due solely to the 
action of Defendant pulling Barnett and therefore, Teerlink, into the residence." R. 73. 
Following this ruling, Mr. Floor agreed to plead guilty to possession of a 
controlled substance and possession of a firearm by a person using drugs. R. 76, 84. 
But, he also reserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. R. 76. 
Following sentencing, Mr. Floor filed a motion to stay the imposition of sentence and 
petitioned the trial judge for a certificate of probable cause that he was likely to prevail 
on appeal. R. 96, 98. The State stipulated to the granting of the stay. R. 109. The trial 
judge issued a certificate of probable cause and ruled that "there is a substantial question 
of law that may result in reversal" on appeal. Id. This appeal followed. R. 113. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, police officers 
may only dispense with the knock-and-announce rule when they have a reasonable 
suspicion that knocking, announcing, or waiting would endanger the police, be futile, or 
inhibit the police investigation such as through the destruction of evidence. The trial 
judge erred in ruling that Mr. Floor's attempt to pull Connie inside the home justified the 
officers' forcible entry. Even viewing the evidence in the most favorable light, Mr. 
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Floor's actions played no role in the officers' decision to enter. In assessing whether 
exigent circumstances support a forcible entry, courts may only rely on those 
circumstances existing at the time of entry as opposed to Mr. Floor's post-entry response. 
The only remaining circumstance that could possibly excuse the officers' failure 
to wait was Connie's half or full step backwards. At best, Connie's step was ambiguous, 
presented no safety concerns, and raised no risk about the possible destruction of 
evidence. Her minor movement was equally consistent with her submitting to the police 
and allowing them to enter the house. The trial judge confused the law on the knock-
and-announce rule in claiming that Connie's step was sufficient to raise safety concerns. 
Further, the record provides no support for concluding that Connie's actions 
posed a danger to the police or suggested that she would destroy evidence. Courts agree 
that the mere nature of drug crimes does not, in itself, endanger police or create a 
reasonable suspicion that evidence may be destroyed if the police follow the knock-and-
announce rule. Further, the officers in this case had no specific concerns for their safety 
or about the destruction of evidence other than their general worries in executing any 
other search warrant. Case law firmly supports these conclusions. 
With particular respect to the potential for destroying evidence, the United States 
Supreme Court recently held that the knock-and-announce rule requires the police to 
identify specific circumstances that show how waiting a reasonable time would risk 
imminent destruction. For example, the police must be familiar with the inside of the 
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place to be searched or know that drugs are stored near a sink or toilet. The police in this 
case conceded that they had no specific knowledge to support any concern for the 
destruction of evidence. Further, the State presented no evidence that Connie's short 
step backwards was connected to the possible destruction of drugs in any way. Courts 
have found no exigency under similar circumstances. 
Although both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have not required 
suppression for illegal but non-constitutional police conduct, their conclusion was based 
on their assumption that the knock-and-announce rule was not constitutionally required. 
Subsequent to these rulings, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment embodies the common law knock-and-announce rule. Because, that rule 
falls within the fundamental right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, 
violations of the knock-and-announce rule require suppression. 
Even under this Court's existing analysis for assessing whether suppression is 
warranted, the trial judge below should have suppressed the fruits of the illegal search. 
Because the police officers had no specific safety concerns and did not suspect the 
destruction of evidence, they violated Mr. Floor's Fourth Amendment rights. This Court 
has ruled that the denial of that fundamental right requires suppression. 
Further, the police officers' illegal entry directly implicated the concerns 
supporting the knock-and-announce rule. The police officers' entrance into Mr. Floor's 
house, grabbing his wife absent exigent circumstances, and then storming the residence 
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with a SWAT team violated Mr. Floor's privacy interests in his dwelling. Likewise, the 
police officers' illegal entry and their subsequent scuffle with Connie and Mr. Floor 
resulted in the primary evil that the knock-and-announce rule seeks to avoid: the risk of 
violence and physical injury. Finally, the absence of justification for the forcible entry 
constitutes a clear Fourth Amendment violation that requires suppression. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial judge erred in ruling that Connie's short step backwards and Mr. Floor's 
attempts to protect her justified Det. Teerlink in immediately entering the residence and 
grabbing Connie. Connie's minor movement was, at best, ambiguous and did not create 
any safety concerns or even hint that she was retreating to destroy evidence. Mr. Floor's 
effort to pull Connie inside the house provided no exigency for entering the house 
because the police first entered illegally without waiting a reasonable time. No other 
exigency supported the police officers' forcible entry. The police admitted that they had 
no specific concerns for their safety or the destruction of evidence. And, the inherent 
nature of drug investigations provides no support for the officers' illegal conduct. 
Finally, the police officers' illegal entry requires suppression because it violated Mr. 
Floor's fundamental right to be free from unreasonable searches. Even if the Fourth 
Amendment did not control, the interests supporting the knock-and-announce rule 
demand suppression. 
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I. A SMALL STEP BACKWARDS PROVIDES NO 
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE POLICE TO DISPENSE 
WITH THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO WAIT A 
REASONABLE TIME FOR A RESPONSE WHEN 
SERVING SEARCH WARRANTS 
Neither safety concerns nor the possible destruction of evidence supported the 
police officers5 failure to wait a reasonable time before entering Mr. Floor's residence. 
In serving search warrants, the state and federal constitutions require police officers to 
announce their authority and purpose and then to wait a reasonable time for a response 
before forcibly entering a residence. The police may only dispense with these 
requirements if exigent circumstances require immediate entry. But, here the only 
evidence to support the police officers' failure to wait was Connie's short step 
backwards. That minor ambiguous act neither indicated a safety concern nor risked the 
destruction of evidence to support the officers' entry below. 
A. Common Law and Constitutional Principles 
Have Long Required Police Officers to 
Announce Their Presence and Authority and 
Then To Wait a Reasonable Time For a 
Response Absent Specific Exigent 
Circumstances. 
Both the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution guarantee all persons the right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. U.S. Const, amend IV; Utah Const., art. I, § 14. This right encompasses the 
common law principle that generally requires the police to "announce [] their presence 
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and authority prior to entering11 a building when serving search warrants. Wilson v. 
Arkansas. 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995). These requirements, known as the "knock and 
announce" rule, mandate that the police wait "a reasonable period of time" before 
entering. State v. Ribe. 876 P.2d 403, 413 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). To hold otherwise, 
would render the rule "meaningless." Richards v. Wisconsin. 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997). 
Although the knock-and-announce rule falls within the constitution's 
reasonableness requirement for searches, that principle "was never stated as an inflexible 
rule requiring announcement under all circumstances." Wilson. 514 U.S. at 934. The 
obligation to announce and wait "gives way when officers 'have a reasonable suspicion 
that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would 
be dangerous or futile, or would . . . inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for 
example, the destruction of evidence.'" United States v. Banks
 % 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003) 
(quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at 394). Likewise, magistrates may issue a no-knock 
warrant if the police can show beforehand that similar circumstances exist. Id. Utah has 
codified these principles in Utah Code Annotated section 77-23-210 (2003); Addendum 
B. 
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this Court reviews the trial court's 
factual determinations for clear error and its legal conclusions for correctness. Ribe, 876 
P.2d at 407. "The assessment of whether reasonable suspicion exists is an objective 
standard based on the totality of the circumstances in which an 'officer is entitled to 
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assess the facts in light of [his or] [her] experience' because 'a trained law enforcement 
officer may be able to perceive and articulate meaning in a given conduct which would 
be wholly innocent to the untrained observer."' State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225, 1228 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85, 88-89 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987)). But, ,f[w]hen a case involves the reasonableness of a search or seizure, [this 
Court] 4afford[s] little discretion to the district court because there must be state-wide 
standards that guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials."' State v. Warren, 
2003 UT App 36, ^ 12, 78 P.3d 590 (quoting State v. Hansen . 2002 UT 125, ^ 26, 63 P.3d 
650). 
B. The Trial Judge Erred in Relying on Mr. 
Floor's Post-Entry Actions Because the Only 
Possible Circumstance That Even Suggests An 
Exigency Was Connie's Innocuous Step 
Backwards. 
Because the police immediately entered Mr. Floor's residence without waiting for 
him or Connie to respond, their entry was only justified if they had a reasonable 
suspicion of danger, futility, or the destruction of evidence. Banks., 540 U.S. at 36. The 
trial judge concluded that officer safety justified the failure to wait. R. 73-74; 129: 35-
36. But, even viewing the trial judge's findings in the most favorable light possible, no 
evidence supports the trial judge's conclusions. State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96, ^ |2, 
89 P.3d 185. The trial judge clearly erred in concluding that officer safety arose "due 
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solely to the action of Defendant pulling Barnett and therefore, Teerlink, into the 
residence." R. 73. In determining "the reasonableness of the officers' decision" to enter 
Mr. Floor's house, the trial judge's inquiry was limited to the reasonableness "as of the 
time they entered." Richards, 520 U.S. at 395. In other words, a reasonable suspicion 
must support the entry "at its inception," United States v. Clav, 640 F.2d 157, 159 (8 th 
Cir. 1981), as opposed to "justifications after the fact." Ribe, 876 P.2d at 415; see also 
Mazepinkv. State. 987 S.W.2d 648, 655 (Ark. 1999), cert, denied 528 U.S. 927 (1999) 
(reasonableness inquiry limited to decision "at the time of [] entry"). 
Contrary to these principles, the trial judge extended the inquiry beyond the time 
of the initial entry when Det. Teerlink reached across the threshold and grabbed Connie. 
Det. Teerlink did not initially enter the residence based on anything that Mr. Floor did. 
Both detectives testified that they first noticed Mr. Floor after Det. Teerlink had entered 
the house and grabbed Connie. R. 129: 6-7, 17. Thus, Mr. Floor's attempt to pull 
Connie inside the house played no role in Det. Teerlink's decision to grab Connie. 
Allowing the police to rely on "justifications after the fact" to support a search would 
allow the police to create an exigency when none actually existed in violation of search 
and seizure principles. Ribe, 876 P.2d at 415. 
Excluding the trial judge's erroneous reliance on Mr. Floor's actions leaves 
Connie's "half step or a step" backwards as the only remaining justification for 
dispensing with the police officers' duty to wait before entering the house. R. 129: 17. 
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The trial judge found that when Det. Teerlink announced that the police were serving a 
search warrant, Connie "responded by attempting to retreat into the residence." R. 72. 
But, the trial judge clearly erred in characterizing Connie's small step as retreating. Ribe, 
876 P.2d at 405. Such an ambiguous gesture provides no basis for concluding that 
waiting for further response "would be dangerous" to the police officers. Richards , 520 
U.S. at 394. Connie's movement was obviously minimal because Det. Teerlink admitted 
that he grabbed her while he "essentially" remained outside the front door. R. 129: 13. 
Thus, despite Connie's half-step or step backwards, she remained within arm's length of 
the police officers. 
Defense counsel illustrated the ambiguity of Connie's reaction by noting that the 
small step raised the obvious inference that she was submitting to the police officers' 
authority and was allowing them to enter the house. R. 129: 22. A lone step backwards 
"offer[s] no threat" to police officers absent additional suspicious facts. United States v. 
Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1575 (5 th Cir. 1995); see also Hechtle. 2004 UT App 96, TJ15, 89 
P.3d 185 (although the presence of agents that mask smells and the condition of 
defendant's eyes were "suggestive of possible drug use, they do not alone create probable 
cause."). The officers' reaction was particularly unreasonable given that the burden to 
wait for further information was "'certainly slight.'" Park v. Commonwealth. 528 
S.E.2d 172, 175 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Miller v. United States . 357 U.S. 301, 310 
(1958)). 
17 
The trial judge's oral decision demonstrates his confusion about the knock-and-
announce rule. First, he characterized Mr. Floor's position as being overly "specific as to 
a knock and announce warrant." R. 129: 36-37. Instead, he deferred to this Court to rule 
differently. Id Rather than Mr. Floor advocating an overly ritualistic position, requiring 
the police to announce their presence and to wait a reasonable time is "' embedded in 
Anglo-American"1 constitutional and common law. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934 (quoting 
Miller. 357 U.S. at 313). Contrary to the trial judge's understanding, Mr. Floor's motion 
to suppress was firmly grounded in the law. 
Further, the trial judge expressed some doubt about his understanding when he 
invited this Court to provide more "specific" direction. R. 129: 36. He also stayed the 
sentence and certified that the case presented a "substantial" question for this Court. R. 
109. The trial judge had good reason to question the soundness of his decision. His 
judge's ruling that a simple step backwards justified dispensing with police officers' duty 
to wait a reasonable time effectively renders the knock-and-announce requirement 
"meaningless." Banks, 540 U.S. at 41. 
C. The Police Officers9 General Safety Concerns 
Provided No Support For Concluding That 
Connie Posed a Danger. 
The police officers' suspicions that they would find drugs at the residence 
provided no support for suspecting that Connie's step posed a danger. The United States 
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Supreme Court has rejected an exception to the knock-and-announce rule for any 
category of crime based solely on the inherent dangerousness of the activity being 
investigated. Richards, 520 U.S. at 394. Doing so would "insulate[],f warrants from 
judicial review and essentially eliminate the knock-and-announce rule. Id. at 393-94; see 
Mazepink, 987 S.W.2d at 655; Park, 528 S.E.2d at 177. 
In any event, review by a magistrate is needed in each case to determine whether 
warning the occupants would reduce or increase the danger to both the police and 
occupants. Because "not every drug investigation will pose" risks to law enforcement, 
each case must be judged on its own merits. Richards, 520 U.S. at 393. In fact, the need 
to alert occupants of police presence may be even greater when investigating inherently 
dangerous criminal activity: "the necessity that police provide notice of their presence 
seems more compelling in the face of startling someone in possession of a weapon." 
People v. Martinez, 513 N.E.2d 607, 610 (111. App. Ct. 1987), cert, denied 488 U.S. 868 
(1988). 
Thus, even if courts could assume that the presence of drugs increases the 
likelihood of violence, a neutral magistrate must review each case individually. 
Richards, 520 U.S. at 393. Then, if the State has evidence that announcing the police 
presence would endanger officers, it can present that evidence to a magistrate. But, 
ultimately, the magistrate and reviewing courts have the duty "to determine whether the 
facts and circumstances . . . justified dispensing with the knock-and-announce 
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requirement." Id. at 394. 
In this case, for example, the detectives conceded that they had no specific 
concerns about possible violence or the presence of weapons. Id_ at 6, 20-21. In fact, 
because the police had only "limited" information, they had no basis for even requesting 
a no-knock search warrant. Id. at 21. Thus, it would be disingenuous for the State to 
claim that this case presented anything other than a routine search for evidence. 
This case is analogous to United States v. Clay in which the Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit ruled that responding to police authority by taking two steps 
backwards did not even suggest any safety concern. 640 F.2d at 158. In that case, the 
police searched a residence for drugs and weapons. IcL During the search, the defendant 
knocked on the front door. Id. A plain clothes officer opened the door, displayed his 
badge, and ordered the defendant inside the house. Id_ The defendant immediately took 
one or two steps backwards. Id. at 158, 160. The plain clothes officer repeated his 
command and the defendant entered the house and submitted to a search. IcL at 158. 
The Eighth Circuit ruled that the defendant's "conduct alone was not suspicious 
under the circumstances:" 
[Defendant] merely hesitated and took a step or two backwards 
(but did not turn around) when confronted at the door by an 
armed man in plain clothes from inside his cousin's house. The 
government's emphasis that appellant's "hesitancy" created 
individualized suspicion falls far short of those cases dealing 
with flight, furtive gestures, or otherwise inexplicable sudden 
movements toward a pocket or other place where a weapon 
could be concealed. Thus, appellant's action in stepping 
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backwards did not justify the search. 
LI at 160 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, Connie's ambiguous movement did not suggest 
that she had a weapon or posed a safety risk. 
D. No Evidence, Other Than General Concerns 
Common to Any Drug Investigation, 
Supported the Possible Destruction of 
Evidence. 
Similar to general safety concerns, ordinary fears that drug users or dealers may 
destroy evidence do not support reasonable suspicion absent specific information 
supporting those fears. Like the possible presence of weapons," 'where the only exigent 
circumstance is that the object of the search is drugs, which by their nature are readily 
disposable, officers may not, without more, dispense with the need to wait a reasonable 
time for the occupants to respond before making a forced entry.'" Park, 528 S.E.2d at 
177 (quoting Hargrave v. Commonwealth. 464 SJE.2d 176, 179 (Va. Ct. App. 1995)). 
Here, the police officers conceded that they had no specific concerns that announcing 
their presence and purpose before serving the warrant risked the destruction of evidence. 
Id. at 20-21. Instead, all of the evidence indicates that this case presented a routine 
service of a search warrant. 
Connie's half-step or step backwards provided no grounds for elevated concerns 
for destroying evidence. The United States Supreme Court recently clarified that the 
police may only forego waiting a reasonable time after announcing their presence and 
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purpose when the delay addresses "the particular exigency claimed." Banks, 540 U.S. at 
40. Thus, "when circumstances are exigent because a [drug] pusher may be near the 
point of putting his [or her] drugs beyond reach, it is imminent disposal, not travel time 
to the entrance, that governs when the police may reasonably enter." IcL With particular 
respect to serving a search warrant for drugs, the police officers' concerns must be rooted 
in the "opportunity" to destroy drugs such as in a "bathroom" or "kitchen." Id. 
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, Connie's small step backwards 
presented no "opportunity" for her to destroy evidence. Id. The State presented no 
evidence that the drugs were located near a sink or toilet or that Connie's minor 
movement otherwise made disposal "imminent." Id, "Without the benefit of further 
evidence, such as the location of the bathroom in relation to the bedroom[s] [or the front 
room] where the drugs were kept, any determination regarding destruction of the drugs 
would be speculative, at best." Mazepink. 987 S.W.2d at 186-87. Connie's "half-step or 
a step" backwards gave no indication that she was attempting to destroy evidence. 
The facts of Park confirm the unreasonableness of the police officers' concerns 
for destroying evidence and even for their safety. In that case, a police officer wearing 
plain clothes served a search warrant by knocking on defendant's front door. Park , 528 
S.E.2d at 174. When, the defendant answered the door, the police officer stated, "I'm 
sorry" as if she were suggesting that she had knocked on the wrong door. IcL at 174, 176. 
The defendant then cast her eyes toward a SWAT team that was assembling outside the 
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residence. Id at 174. When the defendant began to shut the front door, the police officer 
wedged her umbrella in the door frame and forcibly entered the apartment. Id. 
Quoting the Virginia Supreme Court, the Virginia Court of Appeals ruled that the 
shutting of the door did not support an inference that the defendant would retrieve a 
weapon or destroy evidence: 
"The police did not know where in [defendant's] apartment the 
drugs would be found. They were not familiar with the interior 
arrangement of the apartment. They saw no drugs in the 
possession of any of the occupants as they were seated in the 
living room. They saw no firearms and had no reason to believe 
that any would be used by the occupants to the greater peril of 
the officers if they announced their presence. They had no 
reason to believe that the occupants were destroying or planning 
to destroy evidence or that they could have destroyed evidence 
if the officers had demanded entry before breaking down the 
door." 
Id at 177 (quoting Heaton v. Commonwealth, 207 S.E.2d 829, 831 (Va. 1974)). 
Likewise, the police officers in this case appeared in plain clothes and did not 
initially disclose their identities. The officers did not see drugs or weapons in Connie's 
possession or even near her. Like the officers' unfamiliarity with the inside of the 
apartment in Park, the police in this case had only "limited" information and did not 
know about any weapons or the location of sinks or bathrooms inside the house. R. 129: 
21. The police also had no knowledge that Connie or Mr. Floor possessed weapons or 
would destroy evidence. Id. at 6, 13, 20-21. 
The shutting of the door in Park at the sight of the SWAT team appears to be even 
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more suspicious than Connie's step backwards. In contrast to the defendant's response 
in that case, Connie did not move in response to the SWAT team's advances, but, rather, 
in response to Det. Teerlink's announcing his identity and purpose. IcL_ at 10-17, 20. The 
SWAT team remained concealed from Connie's view and only advanced after the 
announcement. IcL Thus, Connie's minor step was less meaningful than the defendant's 
conduct in Park when she saw the SWAT team. The step's lack of significance renders 
the officers' entry unreasonable in violation of constitutional law. 528 S.E.2d at 177; 
Banks, 540 U.S. at 36. 
II. THE POLICE OFFICERS' FORCED ENTRY VIOLATED 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND INTERESTS, THUS 
REQUIRING SUPPRESSION OF THE FRUITS OF THE 
ILLEGAL SEARCH. 
Because the police officers violated the knock-and-announce rule, this Court must 
determine the remedy for the officers' illegal entry. Illegal police conduct requires 
suppression whenever the police violate a person's fundamental rights. Although this 
Court ruled in Ribe that a violation of the knock-and-announce rule does not require 
suppression, it rendered that decision before the United States Supreme Court declared 
that defendants have a constitutional and common law right to require the police to 
announce their purpose and presence and to wait a reasonable time for a response. But, 
even under this Court's test for suppression outlined in Ribe, the police officers' blatant 
disregard for Mr. Floor's rights require suppression. 
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A. Because the Illegal Entry Below Violated Mr. 
Floor's Fundamental Right to Be Free From 
Unreasonable Searches, The Trial Court Must 
Suppress the Fruits of the Illegal Entry. 
Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have ruled that illegally executing a 
search warrant does not require trial judges to suppress the fruits of the illegal search. In 
Ribe, this Court noted that other courts had held that the knock-and-announce rule "cdoes 
not embody a constitutional requirement"' that would require suppression. IJL at 409-10 
(quoting United States v. Nolan. 718 F.2d 589, 600 (3rd Cir. 1983)). This Court then 
quoted the Utah Supreme Court's test for determining whether illegal police conduct 
required suppression: 
"We have previously held that suppression of evidence 
is an appropriate remedy for illegal police conduct only when 
that conduct implicates a fundamental violation of a 
defendant's rights: 
"Only a 'fundamental' violation of [a rule of 
criminal procedure] requires automatic 
suppression, and a violation is 'fundamental' only 
where it, in effect, renders the search 
unconstitutional under traditional fourth 
amendment standards. Where the alleged 
violation . . . is not 'fundamental' suppression is 
required only where: (1) there was 'prejudice' in 
the sense that the search might not have occurred 
or would not have been so abrasive if the rule had 
been followed, or (2) there is evidence of 
intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision 
of the rule . . . . 
. . . It is only where the violation also implicates 
fundamental, constitutional concerns, is 
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conducted in bad-faith or has substantially 
prejudiced the defendant that exclusion may be 
an appropriate remedy." 
[State v. Rowe.] 850 P.2d [427,] 429 [(Utah 1992)] 
(modifications in original; footnotes omitted) (quoting State v. 
FixeL 774 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Utah 1987)). 
Ribe, 876P.2dat406,410. 
But, one year after this Court's decision in Ribe, the United States Supreme Court 
specifically ruled for the first time that the knock-and-announce rule "is an element of the 
reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment." Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 
927, 934 (1995). That Court founded its ruling on the common law history of the knock-
and-announce rule that dates back to as early as the year 1603. Id, at 931-32. The Court 
concluded that this history "leaves no doubt that the reasonableness of a search of a 
dwelling may depend in part on whether law enforcement officers announced their 
presence and authority prior to entering." Id. at 931. 
Based on this authority and contrary to Ribe, the knock-and announce-rule 
M
'embod[ies] a constitutional requirement5" that requires suppression. 876 P.2d at 409 
(quoting Nolan, 718 F.2d at 600). The United States Supreme Court has declined to 
address whether a violation of that rule requires suppression. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 937 
n.4. Nevertheless, given the high status of the right against unreasonable searches, 
suppression would appear to be required. The right to be free from illegal searches, 
including violations of the knock-and-announce rule, ranks as fundamental: "'No right is 
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held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded . . . than the right of every individual to 
the possession and control of his [or her] own person, free from all restraint or 
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.1" Terry v. 
Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford . 141 U.S. 250, 251 
(1891)). 
Moreover, the knock-and-announce rule's common law history establishes that it 
is "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.5" Patterson v. New York. 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977) (quoting Snyder v. 
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)); see also Parke v. Ralev, 506 U.S. 20, 32 (1992) 
("historical tradition [and] contemporary practice" may constitute fundamental rights). 
The United States Supreme Court ruled almost 50 years ago that the rule is "deeply 
rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging application." Miller , 357 U.S. at 
313. Thus, in the words ofRibe, suppression is required because a violation of the 
knock-and-announce rule "renders [a] search unconstitutional under traditional fourth 
amendment standards." 876 P.2d at 406 (quoting Rowe_, 850 P.2d at 429). 
In any event, this Court's ruling in Ribe supports finding a violation of a 
fundamental right in this case. There, two police officers along with members of a police 
strike force approached the defendant's home to execute a knock-and-announce search 
warrant. 876 P.2dat404. As the officers walked to the front door, they saw the 
defendant standing on the porch outside the front door. IcL When the defendant saw the 
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officers approaching, he fled from the house. Id. While several officers gave chase, one 
officer forcibly entered the home without announcing his presence or waiting for any 
occupants to comply, h i 
This Court ruled that because the police officers executed the warrant "in an 
unreasonable manner . . . this case implicated a fundamental, constitutional concern and 
suppression" was, therefore, required. IcL at 413 (footnote omitted). In reaching this 
conclusion, this Court noted that the police cited no "concernf] for their safety, especially 
given that the defendant was secured outside the home, or that the evidence was about to 
be destroyed." Id at 412 (footnote omitted). Instead, "[t]he police simply failed to 
knock and wait for any period of time, much less a reasonable period of time." IcL at 
413. 
The circumstances of this case are equally objectionable. "'Immediate forceful 
entry is particularly offensive, and indeed, dangerous, when the only reasonably visible 
officers are in plain clothes.'" Park. 528 S.E.2d at 176 (quoting State v. Ellis. 584 P.2d 
428, 431 (Wash. 1978)). Further, the police officers' failure to cite any specific safety 
concerns or to assert that the waiting requirement risked the destruction of evidence also 
supports unreasonableness. Moreover, Connie's half or full step backwards raised no 
safety issues and did not place her in position to destroy evidence. The police simply 
failed to wait "a reasonable period of time" before entering the residence. Ribe. 876 P.2d 
at 413. Because the entry was "unreasonable,. . . [it] implicated a fundamental, 
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constitutional concern" that requires suppression. Id 
B. Suppression is Required Even If the Knock-
and-Announce Rule Does Not Implicate 
Fundamental Rights. 
Irrespective of the fundamental nature of the illegal entry in this case, suppression 
is required under the remaining part of the Ribe analysis. This Court held that analyzing 
the interests supporting the knock-and-announce rule is "a useful method for assessing 
Fourth Amendment violations " IcL at 412. Those interests include the right to 
privacy in one's home, avoiding violent clashes, and preventing damage to property: 
The interests supporting the knock-and-announce requirement 
were stated to be "(1) the protection of an individual's private 
activities within his home, (2) the prevention of violence and 
physical injury to both police and occupants which may result 
from an unannounced police entry, and (3) the prevention of 
property damage resulting from forced entry." 
Ribe. 876 P.2d at 406-407 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (footnote omitted) (quoting State v. 
Buck. 756 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1988)). 
Although no property damage resulted from the police officers' illegal entry, the 
officers' conduct directly implicated the other two interests. First, the police violated Mr. 
Floor's privacy interests by entering his home, grabbing his wife, and storming the house 
with over ten officers, including a heavily armed SWAT team. Mr. Floor maintained his 
privacy interests even though the front door was open when the police arrived. In Ribe , 
this Court ruled that an open front door or glass panes on a door do not defeat the 
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expectation of privacy in one's home. Id. at 414. In fact, this Court held that the 
opportunity to see inside a home ,f'tend[s] to mitigate, rather than increase, any need for 
the police to enter without announcing themselves.'" Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. 
MannL 500 N.E.2d 807, 808 (Mass. 1986)). 
Second, the police officers' failure to wait a reasonable time resulted in one of the 
very evils that the knock-and-announce rule seeks to avoid, namely, violence. Mr. 
Floor's efforts to protect Connie illustrates the risks of failing to wait. Although the 
police officers announced their identities and that they were serving a search warrant, 
their forcible entry appears to have shocked Mr. Floor, thus, instinctively causing him to 
protect his wife. Employing this Court's language in Ribe, the officers' entry'"would 
not have been so abrasive"' had the police waited as required under the knock-and-
announce rule. Id. at 410 (quoting Rowe, 850 P.2d at 429) (internal quotation omitted). 
This violence presents a strong case for suppression because neither violence nor 
property damage need actually occur, at all, to implicate the interests supporting the 
knock-and-announce rule. Rather, that rule's goal is to prevent violence and property 
damage. Id at 414. Therefore, police officers undermine that interest even when their 
conduct "increased the risk of violence at the time of illegal entry even though the risk 
did not materialize." Id, at 415. Given the struggle that ensued as a result of the police 
officers' illegal entry, this case presents an even stronger case for suppression than the 
mere potential but absence of violence found in Ribe. 
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In addition to an interests analysis, this Court held that "a clear violation of a 
knock-and-announce statute may still violate constitutional rights. . . ." 876 P.2d at 412. 
Specifically, "[a] clear violation occurs when the police violate the [knock-and-
announce] statute without justification." Id. Utah has codified the knock-and-announce 
rule in Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210 (2003). In Ribe, this Court found no justification 
for failing to wait a reasonable time for a response when "the defendants did not 
withhold response after the police knocked, the defendants did not know of the officers' 
purpose, and the officers were not concerned for their safety or that the evidence was 
about to be destroyed." Id. 
These factors applied with equal force to the circumstances below. In addition to 
the absence of concerns for safety or the destruction of evidence, Connie answered the 
door and engaged the officers in conversation. The police officers5 use of plain clothes 
was "'particularly offensive'" because it confuses occupants about police officers' 
identify and purpose. Park, 528 S.E.2d at 176 (quoting Ellis. 584 P.2d at 431). The 
police added to Connie's confusion when they engaged her in discussion about her lost 
dog. 
Further, even though Connie knew the officers were serving a search warrant, her 
ambiguous step backwards demonstrated no resistence to the police officers' entry and 
reasonably may have meant that she was allowing the officers inside the apartment. 
Because the police officers entered Mr. Floor's residence "without justification," th e 
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officers "'deliberate[ly] disregard[ed]'" the knock-and-announce rule. Ribe, 876 P.2d at 
410, 412 (quoting Rowe, 850 P.2d at 429) (internal quotation omitted). Thus, 
suppression is required. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Floor requests this Court to reverse the trial judge's denial of his motion to 
suppress and to order the trial judge to suppress the fruits of the illegal search. 
Dated this 1\** day of December, 2004. " 1^*> ~~—x^^*^r ~P" 
KENT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PETE FLOOR, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 031907956 FS 
Judge: DENNIS M. FUCHS 
Date: August 16, 2 004 
PRESENT 
Clerk: wendypg 
Prosecutor: BOWN, GREGORY L 
Defendant 
Defendantfs Attorney(s): DELLAPIANA, RALPH 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 22, 1956 
Video 
Tape Number: CD #2 Tape Count: 9-30-59 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - 3rd Degree 
Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 06/28/2004 Guilty 
3. PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 06/28/2004 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON 
a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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Case No: 031907956 
Date: Aug 16, 2 004 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 
Charge # 3 
Fine: 
Suspended: 
Surcharge: 
Due: 
Fine: 
Suspended: 
Surcharge: 
Due: 
Total Fine: 
Total Suspended: 
Total Surcharge: 
Total Principal Due: 
$5000.00 
$4475.00 
$254.73 
$525.00 
$5000.00 
$4475.00 
$254.73 
$525.00 
$10000.00 
$8950.00 
$509.46 
$1050.00 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE FINE SUSPENDED NOTE 
Fines and Fees to be supervised by AP&P. 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $500.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: LDA 
The amount of Adult Probation & Parole 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole, 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1050.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
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PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Participate in and complete any educational; and/or vocational 
training as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Maintain full time employment 
j ^ / 
•4 \ 
Dated this jj^ ' day of Au.llfsf 2oiA 
DE 
Distri ct Court Judge 
By. .._ 
STAMP USEQ AT DIRECTION OF JUDGE 
\ 
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ADDENDUM B 
77-23-210. Force used in executing warrant — When no-
tice of authority is required as a prerequisite. 
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any building, 
room, conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer executing the 
warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter: 
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response or 
he is not admitted with reasonable promptness; or 
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate 
issuing the warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give 
notice. The magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the 
object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or 
that physical harm may result to any person if notice were given. 
ADDENDUM C 
Art. I, § 14 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and 
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirma-
tion, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
ADDENDUM D 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
